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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse or annul the final judgment and 
conviction rendered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah in this 
domestic case. Pursuant to Rule 3 of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Section 78-2a-2(i), 
Utah Code Annotated. 
n. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in imputing full-time employment income to 
the defendant in the amount of $1,019.00 per month, based on a 40 hour week, when defendant 
testified that full time at her longest waitressing job held was 20 hours, and when the parties, 
children needed her during said waitressing hours. Standard of review is whether or not the 
Trial Court abused its discretion. 
Hall v. Hall. 10 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, August 10, 1993; 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.5. 
2. Whether it was a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion for the Court to award 
defendant alimony in the amount of $100.00 per month. The standard of review in alimony 
cases is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
English v. English. 565 P. 2d. at 411 (Utah 1977). 
3. Whether the Court abused its discretion by not including in plaintiffs monthly income 
(for purposes of computing child support and alimony) the contributions by his employer into 
his retirement account in the approximate amount of 27% of his yearly and/or monthly income. 
The standard of review is an abuse of discretion. 
Muir v. Muir. 841 P. 2d. 736 (Utah Ct. App., 1992). 
4. Whether the Court abused its discretion by allowing the plaintiff to deduct from the 
total retirement balance the loan amount of $11,365.22 (which amount he was ordered to assume 
and pay as part of the marital debts of the marriage) in granting defendant one-half (1/2) the 
retirement account in her Qualified Domestic Relations Order. The standard of review for 
valuation of retirement account is if the court abused its discretion. 
Warren v. Warren, 655 P. 2d 784 (Utah, 1982); 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5. 
5. Whether the Court abused its discretion by refusing to award any attorney fees to the 
defendant in this divorce action. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
Huck v. Huck. 734 P. 2d 417 (Utah 1986). 
DL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a civil appeal of the Amended Decree of Divorce herein, entered July 13, 1993. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On June 15, 1992, the plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce. 
On October 3, 1992, defendant filed her Answer and Counter-Claim. 
On October 27, 1992, the parties appeared before Commissioner Michael S. Evans for 
an Order to Show Cause Hearing and the Order on Order to Show Cause was entered December 
10, 1992. 
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On June 11, 1993 and June 14, 1993, the trial of this divorce was held before the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Third District Court Judge. 
On July 13, 1993, the Amended Decree of Divorce was entered by the Court. 
On July 16, 1993, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The full and inclusive disposition is as set forth in the Amended Decree of Divorce, 
entered July 13, 1993. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff DENNIS LEON METCALF and defendant ARLENE ANN METC ALF were 
married on February 10, 1976, and were separated on June 5, 1992. 
2. Two (2) children were born to this marriage, to wit: STEVEN, born April 5, 1978; 
and JEREMY, bom December 1, 1980. 
3. On June 15, 1992, the plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce. 
4. At the time the Decree was entered, plaintiff had been steadily employed with Central 
Valley Water Reclamation for approximately thirteen (13) years (R31, L20), with a monthly 
income of $2,231.00. Defendant had only had about a 18 months of work experience during 
said seventeen (17) years of marriage, and she has no post-tenth grade education (R6, Ll-5) 
and/or training for a job. Defendant was laid off from Holiday Inn where she was making 
approximately $600.00 per month. In or about November 1992, defendant went on Public 
Assistance, through the State of Utah. 
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7. Since June 5, 1992, defendant has had the physical custody of the parties' two 
children, STEVEN and JEREMY. Pursuant to the Order on Order to Show Cause, the plaintiff 
was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $404.00 per month, and alimony to the 
defendant in the amount of $460.00 per month, which figures were computed using the 
plaintiffs monthly figure of $2,200.00 and the defendant's imputed income of $583.00. 
8. While the divorce was pending for about one year the defendant experienced problems 
finding employment and did apply for seven (7) jobs during that time (Defendant's Exhibit 2). 
She was employed as a waitress at The Shed (R4, L19-24), but because she broke her ankle in 
February 1993, she was replaced at that position. She worked for the Delta Center during the 
Jazz games (R4, L22-24). Her job-seeking was hindered by the time she had to be home to get 
her two children off to school, by a vehicle transportation problem in that her 1985 Monte Carlo 
had 146,000 miles on it and required repairs; i.e., at the time of trial it had a steering wheel 
which was falling off, needed tires, new transmission and had a broken windshield (R14, L12-
16); and because the defendant's oldest son, STEVEN, was having gang problems at school and 
defendant had to transfer him to another school, which necessitated defendant driving him to and 
from school and being available for that time period (R15, Ll-25, R16, Ll-2). 
8. Defendant's monthly living expenses are approximately $1,776.67 (Defendant's 
Exhibit 3), which includes a $50.00 per month property tax payment (R18, L17-22), and a 
homeowner's insurance cost of about $35 per month (R19, L4-7). 
9. At all times since December 1, 1992, plaintiff could afford to, and did, pay the 
monthly support and alimony to defendant and also paid $50 per month on his own attorney fees. 
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10. The plaintiff acquired retirement benefits through his employment at Central Valley 
Water Reclamation Facility during this marriage. His employer contributed approximately 27% 
of his gross yearly income into said retirement account (R46, Ll-4). At the time of trial, the 
balance in the retirement account was $67,399.15 (R48, LI). 
11. During this marriage, the parties had borrowed $20,000.00 between 1990 and 1992 
on the retirement balance, of which about $11,000.00 was still owing at the time of the trial 
(R48, L9-10). The monthly payments of $368.00 (R49, L2-4) was re-paying that said balance 
on the loan taken from the retirement account (R49, L2-4). 
12. The loan from said retirement was taken out and used for the purchase of the 
following items which were awarded to plaintiff: a truck (at least $1,000.00) (R38, L16-18); the 
trailer in which the plaintiff resides ($2,000.00) (R53, L16), and a Rotweiller which plaintiff has 
($800.00) (R35, L23; R36, L4). 
13. At the time of trial, the total of plaintiffs monthly expenses was $1,527.00 
(including $402.00 child support). His net disposable income was $707.70. 
14. For purposes of determining child support, the Court used the monthly gross income 
of $2,231.00 for plaintiff and imputed income to defendant in the amount of $1,019.00. 
15. Defendant incurred attorney fees in this pursuit of this divorce, which were testified 
to and reasonableness accepted by plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $1,710.50 (Defendant's 
Exhibit 5). The plaintiff did not have the funds with which to pay said attorney fees (R24, L29-
32). 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court incorrectly fixed the amount and abused its discretion by imputing to defendant 
a 40-hour work week at her (longest) job of 1-1/2 years (in a 17-year marriage). Said position 
was actually a 20-hour work week (which was considered "full time1' at Holiday Inn) (R30, L21-
23) and income was imputed by multiplying the 20-hour work week by 2 to arrive at a 40-hour 
week and his "full-time" imputed income. (2R12, L9-25), (R13, L10). Instead, the Court should 
have imputed minimum wage of $731.00 because plaintiff had been laid off from Holiday Inn 
and she had no other employment history. 
There is no question that the defendant herein is entitled to alimony in that she cannot 
meet her monthly expenses of $1,691.00, even if she were employed making $680.00 per month 
and was receiving child support of $402.00 per month. The plaintiff is able to provide to her 
the sum of $550.00 per month alimony, based on the fact that after having paid all of his 
monthly expenses he will have $714.58 per month free and clear with which to pay alimony. 
Therefore, the Court clearly abused its discretion in only awarding alimony to the defendant in 
the amount of $100.00 per month. 
The Court herein would not consider that plaintiffs employer contributes 27% of his 
gross monthly salary into a retirement account for plaintiffs future benefit. Said amount should 
have been considered in determining plaintiffs monthly gross income to determine child support 
and alimony amounts, thus increasing the child support and alimony amounts which were 
ordered. 
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The Trial Court should have awarded defendant one-half of the total of plaintiffs 
retirement account, not deducting the loan amount of approximately $11,000.00. The loan 
amount should not have been deducted since plaintiff kept some of the assets which were 
purchased from said loan and the loan amount was calculated into his ability to pay alimony and 
also calculated into the property distribution herein. 
The Trial Court clearly erred by failing to award attorney fees in this case where the 
defendant was on public assistance, had not had regular income for a period of approximately 
one year, and could not afford to pay her own attorney's fees. In addition, plaintiff clearly had 
the ability to pay those fees and should have been ordered to pay those fees in the amount of 
$1,710.00. 
VL 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY FIXED THE AMOUNT OF 
INCOME TO IMPUTE TO DEFENDANT 
Section 78-45-7.5 (7)(b)(1992), Utah Code Annotated, sets forth that "if income is 
imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings 
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community.M The only evidence before the Court regarding 
defendant's work history was that she worked for Holiday Inn for 18 months (R12, L18-21) 
working 20 hours per week, which was considered "full-time" at Holiday Inn (R30, L21-23), 
making $2.80 per hour and approximately $100 per week in tips (R30, L17-23). 
Notwithstanding that there was no other evidence presented to the Court regarding waitress' 
hours in this community; i.e., being 20 hours "full-time" or 40 hours "full-time," the Trial 
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Court simply doubled the 20-hour income for the defendant and imputed a 40-hour work week. 
The Trial Court speculated that defendant could make $125 per week tips and a salary of $112 
per week and imputed income to defendant of $1,019 per month. There was no basis or 
evidence on which to impute such full time employment to the defendant; i.e., "prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community" as required by §(7)(b). 
In Hall v. Hall. 219 UAR 29 (Utah Court of Appeals, August 10, 1993), the Court 
remanded the case to the Trial Court to evaluate the employment market for programmers in 
general, and then to make its best effort to adjust for this appellant's unique skills. The Hall 
Court, as herein, made no findings, explicit or implicit, concerning "prevailing earnings for 
persons of similar backgrounds in the community." Id* at 32, 
IT WAS A CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
FOR THE COURT TO ONLY AWARD ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT 
OF $100.00 PER MONTH 
In Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d. 647, 649 (Utah 1988), the Utah Court set forth the factors 
in setting alimony as: 
a. The financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
b. The recipient's ability to produce income; and 
c. The ability of the payor spouse to provide support. 
The defendant's monthly expenses are $1,691.67 (R16, L9-24). She has only limited 
work history making $680.00 per month, no post-tenth grade education or training, and has been 
on Public Assistance during the pendency of the Divorce. 
The plaintiff testified that his income was $2,231.26 per month (R45, L8-13). His actual 
net income after taxes ($254) (Defendant's Exhibit 7) and the $368.00 monthly retirement loan 
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repayment (Defendant's Exhibit 7, page 2) is $1,609.26. After paying his $402.56 child 
support, his $81 in debts (Defendant's Exhibit 7, page 2) and his $420 living expenses 
(Defendant's Exhibit 7, page 3), plaintiff has $705.70 disposable income available for payment 
of alimony herein. 
The Trial Court made the following miscalculations which directly impacted the alimony 
award. 
(1) Found that after deducting only child support and taxes the plaintiff would have $900 
"discretionary income that he could take care of things that he needs to take care o f (2R18, 
L8-13). 
This is clearly incorrect. If only child support ($402.56) and taxes ($254) were deducted 
from plaintiffs monthly gross income of $2231.26, the amount would be $1574.70 
"discretionary income". 
(2) It deducted plaintiffs $360 loan (the $368.00 retirement loan) from that $900 
"discretionary income" and determined that plaintiff would have $550 a month left over to meet 
his expenses (2R19, L17-23). 
This is clearly incorrect. If we take plaintiffs true $1,574.70 "discretionary income" and 
deduct the $368.00 retirement loan payment, he has $1206.70 left over. 
(3) It determined that plaintiff would have less than $348 to live on (2R20, L2-7). 
This is clearly incorrect. Plaintiff will have the $1,206.70 left over for living expenses. 
After paying his living expenses of $81 (Defendant's Exhibit 7: page 2: $50 to Oral Health 
Center and $31 to RC Willey) plus the $420 monthly living expenses (Defendant's Exhibit 7; 
page 3), plaintiff will still have $705.70 free and clear with which to pay alimony. 
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The Court in English v. English. 565 P.2d. at 411, set forth that the "ultimate test of the 
propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all of the factors, the party receiving alimony 
will be able to support him/herself as nearly as possible at the standard of living . . . enjoyed 
during marriage." It is obvious that with $100 per month alimony, $670 in wages and child 
support of $402, for a total of $1,072 per month, defendant's income will fall short of her 
monthly expenses by at least $600. While this case was pending in the Trial Court, defendant 
did find it necessary to seek public assistance. It is now quite probable that she will have to 
seek public assistance again. The Utah Courts have recognized that one purpose of alimony is 
to "prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge," and there is now a high likelihood of 
this. Paffel v. PaffeL 732 P.2d. 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT INCLUDING IN 
PLAINTIFF'S MONTHLY INCOME THE CONTRIBUTIONS BY HIS EMPLOYER 
INTO HIS RETIREMENT ACCOUNT, FOR PURPOSES OF COMPUTING CHILD 
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.5 et al. sets forth that child support shall be based on 
income derived from all sources. The Supreme Court of Utah has expounded on what can be 
considered "income" in Naylor v. Naylor. 700 P.2d. 707 (Utah 1985), and set forth that the 
Court may consider corporate benefits such as pension contributions made by employers. The 
Court of Appeals in Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d. 736 (Utah App. 1992), held that any expenses paid 
by the corporation, such as pension contributions, should be added to the stated salary of the ex-
husband. Id. at 739. 
Plaintiff in this case testified that his employer (at no cost to him) contributed 27% of 
his gross monthly salary into a retirement account for his future benefit (R46, Ll-4). This 27% 
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should have been included in plaintiffs monthly gross income to determine child support and 
alimony amounts herein. In addition, because of this retirement plan there is no FICA withheld 
from plaintiffs pay checks (R49, L19-25), another direct benefit to him. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REDUCING THE PLAINTIFF'S RETIREMENT 
BALANCE BY THE LOAN AMOUNT OF $11,365.22, ONLY GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANT ONE-HALF THE NET RETIREMENT ACCOUNT 
The Trial Court had discretion to divide the parties' property under Utah Code Ann. §30-
3-5, but that discretion was abused. The Court in Warren v. Warren. 654 P.2d. 684 (Utah 
1982), held that the party who incurred certain credit card liabilities for her own benefit should 
bear the responsibility for such liabilities. It was testified to by the plaintiff herein that of the 
retirement balance of the loan, expenditures for that loan had been as follows: a trailer in 
plaintiffs possession (R33, L9-11), with a cost of $2,000; $800 for a Rottweiller dog (R57, 
L18-19), which plaintiff kept; a truck (R38, L16-18); and a 1969 Ford truck (R50, L17-20) for 
at least $1,000. All of these amounts should have been paid directly by the plaintiff and not 
deducted from the retirement amount which defendant was awarded in her Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING 
ANY ATTORNEY FEES TO DEFENDANT HEREIN 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989) provides that either party to a divorce action may be 
ordered to pay the attorney fees of the party in need. It is clear by the aforestated monthly 
expenses of $1,666 per month and defendant's ability to meet those monthly expenses being 
short by at least $550, that defendant is in need of an award for attorney fees for pursuit of her 
divorce action. The plaintiff, on the other hand, has been employed for 12 years and has 
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monthly net disposable income of $1,206.70 with which to pay defendant's attorney fees herein. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the Trial Court had unreasonably failed to award attorney 
fees in Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d. 417 (Utah 1986). In this case the wife had income which 
barely covered her monthly expenses and the Court held that she should at least receive one-third 
of her attorney fees. Defendant herein has no income, and even if income was imputed to her 
of approximately $600 per month, she could not afford to pay her attorney fees based on her 
monthly expenses far exceeding her imputed income (even with child support and alimony 
award). 
It was clear by the evidence that defendant did not have the funds to pay her attorney fees 
(R24, L12-21), which attorney fees were contained in exhibit 5, in the amount of $1,710. This 
amount was accepted by opposing counsel as being reasonable and necessary attorney fees (R25, 
Lll-16). 
The Court incorrectly fixed the amount and abused its discretion by imputing to defendant 
a 40-hour work week at her (longest) job of 1-1/2 years (in a 17-year marriage). Said position 
was actually a 20-hour work week (which was considered "full time" at Holiday Inn) (R30, L21-
23) and income was imputed by multiplying the 20-hour work week by 2 to arrive at a 40-hour 
week and his "full-time" imputed income. (2R12, L9-25), (R13, L10). Instead, the Court should 
have imputed minimum wage of $731.00 because plaintiff had been laid off from Holiday Inn 
and she had no other employment history. 
There is no question that the defendant herein is entitled to more than $100.00 alimony, 
since she cannot meet her monthly expenses of $1,691.00, even if she were employed making 
$680.00 per month, was receiving child support of $402.00 per month and the $100.00 alimony. 
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The plaintiff is able to provide to her the sum of $550.00 per month alimony, based on the fact 
that after having paid aU of his monthly expenses he will have $705.70 per month free and clear 
with which to pay alimony. Therefore, under all alimony factors contained in the Davis case, 
the Court clearly abused its discretion in only awarding alimony to the defendant in the amount 
of $100.00 per month. 
The Court herein would not consider that plaintiffs employer contributes 27% of his 
gross monthly salary into a retirement account for plaintiffs future benefit. The Muir Court 
held that said amount should have been considered in determining plaintiffs monthly gross 
income, to determine child support and alimony amounts, thus increasing the child support and 
alimony amounts which were ordered. 
The Trial Court should have awarded defendant one-half of the total of plaintiffs 
retirement account, not deducting the loan amount of approximately $11,000.00. The loan 
amount should not have been deducted since plaintiff kept some of the assets which were 
purchased from said loan and the loan amount was calculated into his ability to pay alimony and 
also calculated into the property distribution herein. 
The Trial Court clearly erred by failing to award attorney fees in this case where the 
defendant was on public assistance, had not had regular income for a period of approximately 
one year, and could not afford to pay her own attorney's fees. In addition, plaintiff clearly had 
the ability to pay those fees and should have been ordered to pay those fees in the amount of 
$1,710.00. 
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vn. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant seeks the following relief: 
1. A recomputed and increased child support award, taking into consideration plaintiffs 
employer's retirement contribution of 27% of his wages; 
2. A reversal of the Trial Court's alimony award of $100.00 per month and reinstate it 
with the sum of $550.00, retroactive to July 13, 1993; 
3. Issuance of an Order increasing defendant's share of plaintiffs retirement at Central 
Valley Reclamation by $5,500;00; 
4. A reversal of the Trial Court's award of no attorney fees to defendant and reinstate 
with the sum of $1,700.00; 
5. An award of costs of this Appeal and attorney fees incurred for this Appeal to 
defendant and payable by plaintiff to defendant in an amount to be submitted to this Court after 
its Decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^/_ day of October, 1993. 
Laura L. Boyer 
Attorney for Defendant 
* ^ / 7 Vf A - ^ V ^ 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Amended Decree of Divorce and Judgment 
ju*r^ 
WALKER E. ANDERSON UTAH STATE BAR #113 
Mountain America Credit Union Building 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363 6426 
Telcopier: (801) 322 3904 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS LEON METCALF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARLENE ANN METCALF and 
the STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF HUMAN SERVICES, 
Defendant. 
This case and action came on regularly for trial before 
this Court on June 11, 1993. Plaintiff and his Attorney Walker E. 
Anderson were present. Defendant, Arlene Ann Metcalf was present 
with her Attorney Laura L. Boyer. The State of Utah was 
represented by Assistant Attorney General Karma K. Dixon. Some 
Stipulations were made to the Court. Other issues were tried. 
Testimony was taken. Some exhibits were received. Arguments were 
heard. The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law now 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
By 
FILED WSTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
ML 12 1993 
AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 924902516DA 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Exhibit "A" 
1. Dennis Leon Metcalf and Arlene Ann Metcalf are granted a 
Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore 
existing between them which Decree is final upon entry. 
2. Arlene Ann Metcalf is awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of Steven Metcalf (born April 5, 1978) and Jeremy 
Metcalf (born December 1, 1980) subject to the following rights of 
reasonable visitation periods and times by Dennis Leon Metcalf: 
A» Alternate Weekends from Friday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m. 
B. Alternate Wednesdays from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. 
C. Christmas Day from 1:00 p.m. through 1/2 of the childrens 
total Christmas school vacation. 
D. Thanksgiving in even years beginning in 1994 from the day 
before Thanksgiving at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
E. Easter in odd years beginning in 1995 from Friday at 6:00 
p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
F. Alternate other major holidays from 6:00 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 6:00 p.m. on the holiday. 
G» Holiday visitation to take precedence over weekend 
visitation, and no changes should be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend schedule. 
H* Plaintiff should have Father's Day as appropriate from 
6:00 p.m. the day before until 6:00 p.m. the day of. 
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I. Defendant should have Mother's Day as appropriate from 
6:00 p.m. the day before until 6:00 p.m. the day of. 
J. Each child's birthday and Plaintiff's birthday one evening 
during the week of the birthday from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 
p.m. 
K. Four (4) continuous weeks during the summer with written 
notice of dates provided to the Defendant by May 1st with 
the Defendant to have alternate weekends, holiday, and 
phone visitation during that time. 
L. Two 2 week periods per year, with written notice of dates 
to the Defendant at least 3 0 days prior to visitation with 
the Defendant to have alternate weekends, holiday, and 
phone visitation during that time. 
M. Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year 
uninterrupted possession of the childi n for purposes of 
vacation, provided the same does not interfere with 
holiday visitation per above, and each parent shall notify 
the other in writing of such two week period at least 3 0 
days in advance. 
N. Reasonable telephone visitation before 8:00 p.nu 
O. Other times as the parties may agree. 
3. Dennis Leon Metcalf shall continue to provide and maintain 
his current group policy of major medical insurance available 
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through his employment for the benefit of Steven Metcalf and Jeremy 
Metcalf until they reach the age of eighteen or emancipation. 
A. Arlene Ann Metcalf shall pay all routine medical and 
dental expenses, including routine office visits, physical 
examinations, and immunizations incurred for the 2 children. 
B. That any extraordinary medical expenses for the children 
if not paid by the medical policy insurance coverage through Dennis 
Metcalf*s employment, then the extraordinary medical expenses shall 
be paid 68% by Dennis Metcalf and 32% by Arlene Metcalf. 
4. Mr. and Mrs. Metcalf are mutually restrained and ordered 
not to bother, molest, harass, threaten or interfere with the other 
at any time and place. 
5» Each party is ordered to assume and pay his or her own 
debts incurred after the parties separation June 2, 1992 and hold 
the other harmless therefrom. 
6. Mr. Metcalf is ordered to pay child support, commencing 
July 1, 1993, for the parties two children in the total amount of 
$4 02.56 per month to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 
45011, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84145 unless the Office gives written 
notice that payments should be sent elsewhere. 
7. That the State of Utah Office of Recovery Services will 
prepare a NOTICE TO WITHHOLD, commencing July 1, 1993, under Part 
IV Chapter 11, Title 62A, Utah Code as Amended, and serve Mr. 
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Metcalffs employer, Payroll Department, Central Valley Water, 800 
West Central Valley Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, to withhold 
$402.56 each month for child support. 
8. A Qualified Domestic Relations. Order shall issue as it 
relates to the Central Valley Water Reclamation Facility retirement 
plan of Mr. Metcalf with 50% of the value of the amount of the 
retirement as of the date that the Decree is entered to Arlene Ann 
Metcalf, which QDRO will be prepared by her attorney. 
9. Mr. Metcalf will continue to pay the loan amount borrowed 
from the retirement plan, and hold Mrs. Metcalf harmless therefrom. 
10. The home and real property located at 6028 W. Brass Place, 
Kearns, Utah 84118 shall be immediately sold for a reasonable 
offer. If there is any equity remaining after the closing, it 
shall be paid to Mrs. Metcalf. If there is any deficiency 
remaining after the closing, Mr. and Mrs. Metcalf shall be 
responsible and liable equally to pay the deficiency. 
11. Mr. Metcalf shall pay alimony to Mrs. Metcalf of $100.00 
per month, in accord with Section 3 0-3-5. 
12. Mr. and Mrs. Metcalf shall work out an agreement for their 
individual financial benefits regarding the two tax exemptions of 
the children. 
13. Each party shall pay their own costs and attorney fees. 
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14. Each party shall sign and deliver any and all documents 
necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of the Decree and 
Judgment* 
15. Mr. Metcalf is awarded the following described personal 
property in his control and possession: Trailer, 1965 G.T.O., 
Truck, Lawn Mower, Camera, 1/2 Albums, 1/2 Cassettes, Movie 
Cassettes, C.D.'s, Entertainment Center, T.V. w/ remote, Stereo 
Receiver, Cassette Deck, V.C.R., C D . Player, Porcelain Doll, 
Tiffany Lamp, 4 Speakers, and Rotweiler (female). Mr. Metcalf 
shall immediately pick up from Mrs. Metcalf the motor equipment in 
the basement of the house. 
16. Mrs. Metcalf is awarded the following described personal 
property in her control and possession: Gas Barbecue, 1985 Monte 
Carlo, Sofa, T.V. w/ remote, V.C.R., Kitchen set, 2 Bar Stools, 
Microwave, Refrigerator, Bedroom Set, Washer & Dryer, 1/2 Albums, 
1/2 Cassettes, Table Lamp, End Tables, House Decor, Linen, Kitchen 
Ware, and Phone. Mr. Metcalf shall have the Gas Barbecue delivered 
to Mrs. Metcalf. 
17. That Plaintiff is ordered to maintain hZs current life 
Insurance policy naming the minor children of t#e parties as sole, 
.rrevocable beneficiaries thereof. 
DATgD^this?^/^^ day of 
l V^&r$i(fyfi.JRip IS A liRlJS? rr: / -
Approved as to form: 
Attorney fory Mrs. i l e t c a l f 
*1CA£MA K. DIXON, for Sta" a t e of Utah 
7 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned certifies that true and correct cop- of the DEFENDANT'S APPEAL 
BRIEF w sent via U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, this £>/f7day of October, 1993, to the 
following: 
Walker E. Anderson, Esq. 
Mountain America Credit Union 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
KARMA DIXON, Esq. 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 45011 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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